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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
.cannot, by necessity, preclude retrial in every instance where the jury
.is discharged prior to the verdict.3 9 If the rule is retained, as it appears
that it will be, there remains the necessity of determining under what
circumstances retrial is precluded.4" Under Perez, anytime the discharge is
necessary in the interest of public justice reprosecution is constitutionally
permissible. But society's interest in determining the guilt of an accused
"on the merits may be too easily subordinated to the rights of the accused
by a protective court. Care must be taken to see that these competing in-
terests are recognized and properly evaluated. Courts must see that re-
-trial following a discharge of the jury does not violate policies under-
girding the double jeopardy provision of the Constitution, but this deter-
mination must be made in light of the competing interests of society and
the accused, and in the overall interest of justice. Overzealous concern for
the rights of the defendant must not be allowed to present an "obstacle to
the administration of justice in many cases in which there is no semblance
of the type of oppressive practices at which the double-jeopardy prohibi-
tion is aimed."'
JoHN E. HODGE, JR.
Criminal Procedure-State Hearsay Exception for Co-conspirator's
Statement Held not to Violate Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
The hearsay rule,' because of its many exceptions,2 abounds with con-
troversy more than any other area in the law of evidence.' A particularly
"See United States v. Jorn, 91 S. Ct. 547, 554-55 (1971); SIGLER 74.° 'See United States v. Jorn, 91 S. Ct. 547, 554-55 (1971). It has been sug-
gested that the problem of attachment of jeopardy could be eliminated by the
adoption of the English rule which requires a final judgment of acquittal or con-
viction to constitute prior jeopardy. SIGLER 223.
" Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1949).
1 The hearsay rule has been defined as the exclusion "of testimony in court or
written evidence, of a statement made out of court, such statement being offered
as an assertion to show the truth of matters asserted therein, and this resting for
its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court assertion." C. McCORMICK, LAW
oF EVDIDECE § 225 (1954).
Historically there are several rationales for the rule, the most significant ones
being that the adversary should have full opportunity for cross-examination; that
testimony should be given under oath; that the trier of fact should have an
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness; and that errors in transmission
are nonexistent when the declarant is in court. Id. § 224.
2 Under the hearsay exceptions the courts have admitted into evidence out-of-
court statements to prove the truth of what was asserted. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 1420 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
3It has been estimated that the hearsay rule accounts for at least one third of
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acute problem in this area stems from the conflict between the goals of the
hearsay-rule exceptions and those of the confrontation clause of the sixth
amendment.4 The Supreme Court has cogently stated the purposes of the
confrontation clauseP as being
to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits . . . [from] being used
against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-exam-
ination of the witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not only
of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness,
but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that
they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and
the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of
belief.6
On the other hand, the hearsay-rule exceptions-grounded in theory upon
shifting combinations of necessity and circumstantial trustworthiness--
frequently have been invoked to admit evidence of the out-of-court state-
ments of declarants not present in court and thus a fortiori not available
for confrontation.' The Supreme Court recently analyzed this obviots
conflict in Dutton v. Evans,9 but left the ultimate resolution of the issue
unclear. -
Evans, the petitioner in Dutton, along with Truett and Williams were
jointly indicted in a Georgia court for the murders of three police officers,
but Evans pleaded not guilty and exercised his right under Georgia law
to a separate trial."0 He was convicted of murder and-sentenced to death.-
'Evans then brought a habeas corpus proceeding in a federal district court,
alleging that he had been denied the constitutional right of confrontation
all evidentiary problems in the courts today. Note, Erosion of the Hearsay Ride,
3 U. RicH. L. Raw. 89, 92 (1968).
'"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him .... U.S. CoxrsT. amend. VI. This clause
applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400, 403 (1965).
The similarity of the goals of the confrontation clause and the hearsay rule
might suggest that the two can be equated. However, the Supreme Court does not
accept this view. "While it may readily be conceded that hearsay: rules and the
Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values, it is quite a
different thing to suggest that the overlap is complete .... " California v. Green,
399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970).
' Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
5 WIGmORE §§ 1421-22.
8 Mattox v United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895) ; Tracey v. State, 97 Ill. 101,
106 (1880).
- 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
10 Id. at 76.
* I d.
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at his trial by the admission into evidence of a statement allegedly made
by Williams to a fellow prisoner named Shaw.'2 Williams never appeared
at Evans' trial. However, at the trial Shaw was permitted to testify that
he had asked Williams the result of Williams' arraignment proceeding,
whereupon Williams had remarked: "If it hadn't been for that dirty
son-of-a-bitch Alex Evans, we wouldn't be in this now."' 8 The Georgia
Supreme Court upheld the admission of Shaw's testimony under a Georgia
statute permitting the admission into evidence against a defendant of state-
ments made by the defendant's co-conspirators, provided the conspiracy is
first prima facie established. 14 The court held the statement admissible
even though it was made during the concealment phase of the criminal
project.' 5
The "co-conspirators" hearsay exception applied in federal courts
allows admission of only those statements made by co-conspirators "in
the course of and in the furtherance of the conspiracy."1 6 The federal rule
is thus narrower than the Georgia statutory hearsay exception,1 7 but in
Dutton the Court held this fact insufficient to invalidate the Georgia statute
under the confrontation clause.' 8 In reaching this result the Court stated
2Id. at 79.
13Id. at 77.
"After the fact of conspiracy shall be proved, the declarations by any one of
the conspirators during the pendency of the criminal project shall be admissible
against all." GA. CoD ANN. § 38-306 (1954 rev.).
"5Evans v. State, 222 Ga. 392, 396-97, 150 S.E.2d 240, 244-45 (1966). The
Georgia court found a conspiracy to exist because at the time the statement was
made by Williams, Evans and Williams "were still concealing their identity, keep-
ig secret the fact they had killed the deceased, if they had, and denying their guilt.
There was evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case of conspiracy to steal
the automobile... ." Id. at 402, 150 S.E.2d at 248. However, a more accurate view
seems to be that of Justice Marshall, dissenting in Dutton: "It is difficult to
conceive how Williams could be part of a conspiracy to conceal the crime when all
the alleged participants were in custody and he himself had already been arraigned."
400 U.S. at 106 n.8.
26400 U.S. at 81.
"As was stated by the plurality in Dutton:
It is settled that in federal conspiracy trials the hearsay exception that
allows evidence of an out-of-court statement of one conspirator to be admitted
against his fellow conspirators applies only if the statement was made in the
course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy, and not during a subsequent
period when the conspirators were engaged in nothing more than conceal-
ment of the criminal enterprise .... The hearsay exception that Georgia
applied in the present case, on the other hand, permits the introduction of
evidence of such an out-of-court statement even though made during the
concealment phase of the conspiracy.
Id.
Is When used in the discussion of the Dutton case, "the Court" refers to Justice
Stewart's plurality opinion. This was a four-one-four decision; Justice Harlan,
[Vol. 49
HEARSAY AND CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
that it "has never indicated that the limited contours of the hearsay excep-
tion in federal conspiracy trials are required by the Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause. To the contrary, the limits of this hearsay exception
have simply been defined by the Court in the exercise of its rule-making
power in the area of the federal law of evidence."' 9 In so holding, the
Court has deviated from its position in earlier cases, and a brief survey
of recent cases concerning confrontation and hearsay problems illustrates
the shift which the Court has made.
In Pointer v. Texas20 the Court held that the sixth amendment rights
of defendants in criminal trials to confront and cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses extended to state trials."' Pointer was accused of robbing one
Phillips. At a preliminary hearing, witnesses were examined by an
assistant district attorney. Among those questioned was Phillips, who
identified Pointer as the robber. Pointer was not represented by counsel
at the preliminary hearing, and he did not avail himself of his opportunity
to cross-examine the witness. Before the trial Phillips moved to another
state, and the prosecutor offered the transcript of Phillips' testimony into
evidence against Pointer. The Court held that Pointer had not been
afforded a realistic opportunity to cross-examine Phillips, and that the
introduction of the evidence was a denial of the defendant's right to
confrontation guaranteed by the sixth amendment.' The facts in Dutton
are somewhat similar to those in Pointer, although Dutton involved an
out-of-court statement rather than a formal transcript from a preliminary
hearing. However, this factual difference, if justifying different results
in the two cases at all, would seem to dictate results contrary to the actual
holding. Preliminary hearing testimony, given in defendant's presence,
representing the "one," concurred in the result but not the means of achieving it.
He did not see the sixth amendment as being well suited for taking into account the
many factors involved in weighing the appropriateness of evidentiary rules, and
thought that application of the due-process-of-law mandate was the correct procedure
for the adjudication of such issues. Id. at 97. One writer has sharply disagreed
with justice Harlan's view, noting that "[a] certain notion of fairness has already
pervaded the courts' general treatment of evidence in criminal trials," and assert-
ing that to suggest that the accused is "sufficiently protected by the due process
clause would be to regard the confrontation clause merely as a constitutional
anachronism." Note, Preserving the Right to Confrontationt-A New Approach
to Hearsay Evidence in Criminal Trials, 113' U. PA. L. REv. 741, 74-3 (1965)." 400 U.S. at 82 (emphasis added).
9O380 U.S. 400 (1965).
I1 1d. at 403.
22 If a federal standard could be gleaned from this and similar cases discussed
infra, it would be that the right of confrontation gives a criminal defendant a
chance "to face and effectively cross-examine the witness testifying against him."
Note, 113 U. PA. L. Rxv., supra note 18, at 745.
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obviously presents a stronger case for admission than the simple extra-
judicial statement involved in Dutton. This seems true even if the latter
statement was in fact made-a matter which is open to considerable
doubt.23
In Douglas v. Alabama2 4 the court followed the Pointer reasoning.
Douglas had been convicted in a state court of assault with intent to
murder." Loyd, Douglas's alleged accomplice who had been convicted in
a prior trial, invoked the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrim-
ination when called as a witness by the prosecution in Douglas's trial.20 The
prosecutor, examining Loyd as a hostile witness, read from Loyd's con-
fession-which implicated Douglas-in order to "refresh" Loyd's mem-
ory 27 After reading each sentence the prosecutor asked the witness
if the statement was his. Loyd firmly declined to answer these questions,
even when ordered to do so by the trial judge and faced with a contempt
citation.28 The Court held that the lack of opportunity to cross-examine
Loyd denied Douglas his constitutional right to confrontation. 29 On the
facts 'Douglas and Dutton, are strikingly similar-yet the Court reached
different results. In both cases the state charged two defendants with a
crime and tried them separately. In both the state first prosecuted one
defendant and then used the first defendant's out-of-court statement in the
trial of the second defendant. In Douglas the Court disapproved such
use because the declarant, though in court, could not be cross-examined on
the statement imputed to but not admitted by him. In Dutton the pros-
ecution did not even call the declarant to the stand. 0 If the right to
cross-examine is a standard in this context, as some writers have argued, 81
it was inexplicably denied in Dutton.
After Douglas was decided the Court developed the proposition that
while the confrontation clause and the basic hearsay rule are analogous
in numerous respects, it is still, possible for hearsay to be admissible in
exceptional circumstances, pursuant to established rules of evidence,
'3 See note 39 infra.
, 380 U.S. 415 (1965). Douglas and Pointer were decided on the same day.
25 Id. at 417.
20 Id. at 416. At the time of Douglas's trial, Loyd had an appeal pending and
decided not to testify in order not to compromise his own case.
2 Id.
" Id. at 416 & n... The judge did not in fact hold Loyd in contempt, but he
interrupted Dbugla's trial to sentence Loyd to twenty years in prison. Id.'2Id. at 419.
so 400 U.S. at 102.
" See note 22 smpra.
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despite the resultant departure from the most stringent possible inter-
pretation of the confrontation clause."2 Barber v. Page33 is a striking
example of this development. Barber and Woods were charged jointly
with armed robbery in a state court, Woods having given the testimony
that incriminated Barber at a preliminary hearing. By trial time Woods
was in prison in another jurisdiction, and his statement was admitted in
Barber's trial because Woods was not available to testify. 'Barber was
convicted and sought habeas corpus, claiming that the use of the transcript
of Woods's testimony deprived him of his right of confrontation. The
Supreme Court agreed that Barber -was entitled to a new trial but did not
hold that the confrontation requirement barred the testimony in any event.
It decided only that unavailability was not sufficiently shown in the absence
of a good faith attempt to secure the presence of the witness."4
If Woods was "not unavailable," one wonders why Williams was
"available" in Dutton. In Dutton the state made no attempt to call
Williams, and it is possible that he would have testified had he been
called. He had already been convicted and possibly would not have
asserted his right against self-incrimination as did Loyd in Douglas.
Pondering the result of the state's calling Williams to the stand is a
purely academic exercise, but the fact remains that under the earlier cases
the state either had to confront the defendant with the witnesses against
him, or (at the least, under Barber) prove frustration of a good faith
effort to procure his presence, In Dutton the state was permitted to in-
troduce damaging evidence 5 without bearing the risk of trial confronta-
tion. By Barber standards, which require a showing of ample opportunity
to cross-examine at a prior stage of the proceedings and also, of a good
faith effort to procure the presence of the declarant at the trial, apparently
Dutton was decided incorrectly. Arguably, unavailability-the require-
ment of the hearsay rule exception-was established in Barber;3 6 yet the
"Note, Constitutionai Law-Witnesses-The Confrontation Clause of the
Sixth Amendment Requires State Authorities to Make a Good Faith Effort to
Produce Out of State Witnesses at Trial, 47 TEX. L. ZEv. 331, 335 (1969).
"390 U.S. 719 (1968).
"Id. at 724-25.
"For a contrary view of the quality of the evidence in question, see justice
Blackmun's concurring opinion in Dutton, 400 U.S. at 90.
" Various courts and commentators have in the past assumed that the mere
absence of a witness from the state was sufficient grounds for dispensing with con-
frontation. See the cases collected in 5 WIGMoR § 1404, at n.5 (Supp. 1970).
See also, e.g., McCoRmick, supra note 1, § 234. However, this is now a questionable
theory because of the increased cooperation among the states themselves and
between the states and the federal government. When a prospective witness is in
federal custody, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (5) (1964), gives federal courts "the power
1971]
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Court again recognized that the hearsay exceptions must be applied in the
context of constitutional limitations.87
In Dutton the question arises why the prosecution even used the con-
troversial evidence. Arguably it was crucial and damaging evidence, for
under Georgia law Evans could not have been convicted on the uncorrob-
orated testimony of his accomplice, Truett." Corroboration was a key
element in Evan's conviction, and that corroboration could well have been
Shaw's questionable testimony. However, there were eighteen other wit-
nesses besides Shaw and Trutt, the eyewitness. Surely one of the eighteen
could have supplied the required testimony. The Court of Appeals noted
that there was grave doubt that Williams had made the statement attribu-
ted to him, 9 and stated that Shaw's account of his conversation with
Williams was notable for "its basic incredibility."40 In addition, the
veracity of the statement, if made, was at best dubious.4 It is clear that the
statement was neither necessary nor reliable, and the prejudice to Evans
was in fact real. Indeed, the dissent in Dutton questioned whether "Wil-
liams' accusation relate[d] to Evans as a man with powerful and un-
scrupulous enemies, or Evans as a murderer." 42 The plurality apparently
to issue writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum at the request of state prosecutorial
authorities." Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724 (1968).
" The doctrinal distinction between Dutton on the one hand, and Pointer,
Douglas, and Barber on the other, seems tenuous at best. In the latter cases there
was no mention of a conspiracy. Therefore, the hearsay exception involved was
not that of a co-conspirator's statement as in Dutton. The sixth amendment in those
cases was held to exclude the questionable evidence in issue. However, in Dutton,
where the facts were similar-the only difference of any significance being the
hearsay exception involved-the evidence in issue was admitted. Should different
results obtain merely because of the co-conspirator label? The results of an affirma-
tive answer would be startling, for if the state only has to establish a conspiracy
(often an easy thing to accomplish), and if upon such a finding hearsay evidence
can be admitted on the tails of the co-conspirator exception, then the constitutional
right of confrontation can be effectively abrogated.
38 400 U.S. at 108.
S'In the court's words,
Shaw's testimony was somewhat incredible. He testified that Williams was
talking to him in a normal voice through a ten-by-ten plateglass window in
a prison hospital door, while Williams was lying on a bed in the room and
Shaw was standing in the hall. Shaw had stated in the Williams trial that
the window was covered only by wire mesh. The fact that it was covered
by a pane of plate glass was brought out in Evans' trial. Moreover, evidence
was submitted but rejected by the trial court which tended to show that
Shaw's testimony may have been compensation for a respite from the dull
routine of prison life.
Evans v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 826, 828 n.4 (5th Cir. 1968)."° Id.
'" See note 39 supra.
42400 U.S. at 104.
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adopted the latter interpretation, but the fact remains that without cross-
examination of Williams himself, "the jury was left with only the un-
elucidated, apparently damning, and patently damaging accusation as told
by Shaw."4
The Court has labored to discover the reach of the confrontation clause
when measured against conflicting demands of the hearsay exceptions.
One solution to the dilemma, wholly consistent with the decision in
Barber, would be to read the confrontation clause as a canon of pros-
ecutorial conduct. So read, the confrontation clause would require
prosecutors to make good faith attempts to procure people to testify, and
to allow hearsay only when necessity, trustworthiness and fairness-
arguably absent in Dutton-are present. Interpreted in this fashion, the
confrontation clause would bind the prosecutor, notwithstanding that an
exception to the hearsay rule would permit admission of the questionable
statement.44 A confrontation clause construed as a standard of pros-
ecutorial conduct might reasonably have resulted in a contrary holding in
Dutton. In addition, such a construction would afford improved pros-
ecutorial behavior and more ascertainable standards.
ROBERT D. Rizzo
Criminal Procedure-Voluntariness of Guilty Pleas in Plea
Bargaining Context
One of the basic purposes of our system of justice is to separate the
guilty defendant from the innocent.' The formal trial process and the
guilty plea process are the only means used to accomplish this end. The
formal trial process is laced with procedural, evidentiary, and other safe-
guards to protect against conviction of the innocent and to ensure that the
accused are better able to defend against the power and the resources of
the state.2 However, the guilty plea process contains far fewer safeguards,
and the safeguards that do exist vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.3
'8 Id.
"Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724 (1968).
1 D. NEWMAN, COIvcTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOcENCE
WITHOUT TRIAL 10 (1966).
'See L. MAYERS, THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 11-150 (rev. ed. 1963) for
a general discussion of the safeguards available at all stages of the procedure.
'D. NEw MAN, supra note 1, at 10.
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